Maldives fuel security faces a Gulf war stress test

The Maldives’ fuel and energy security has moved into sharper focus after a drone strike hit fuel storage tanks at Oman’s Port of Salalah, one of the Indian Ocean’s key logistics nodes. Reuters reported that drones struck oil storage facilities at the port, that Omani civil defence warned the fire could take time to contain, and that Maersk said operations at Salalah had been paused until further notice. Reuters also reported that Oman’s authorities said there had been no disruption to the continuity of oil supplies or petroleum derivatives inside the country. Gulf News separately reported that emergency crews were still battling the blaze and that the nature of fuel storage fires could prolong the response.

For the Maldives, the issue is not only whether Oman itself stays supplied. The larger concern is concentration risk. Based on Maldives Customs Service import data for January to November 2025, analysed for MNN News, roughly 80.0% of the total CIF value of fuel imports came from just two Middle Eastern suppliers, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. In value terms, that is about MVR 7.7 billion out of MVR 9.6 billion.

The dependence is particularly high in the categories that matter most to day-to-day economic continuity. Aviation gas imports were 93.7% sourced from Oman and the UAE. Cooking gas was even more concentrated at 94.5%. Marine gas oil, the diesel that underpins inter-island transport, shipping and a large part of the fishing and logistics economy, stood at 81.1%. Petrol was lower, but still significant, at 64.2%.

That structure does not prove an immediate shortage. It does, however, show how quickly a regional security shock can become a Maldivian economic risk. If fuel infrastructure in Oman is struck, if shipping schedules are interrupted, or if insurers and carriers price Gulf routes as more dangerous, the first effects for the Maldives may appear not as empty tanks, but as higher landed costs, delivery uncertainty, tighter inventories and pressure on retail prices.

The aviation exposure is especially sensitive. With 93.7% of aviation gas import value tied to Oman and the UAE, any sustained disturbance in Gulf supply chains could affect airline operating costs, bunkering economics and route planning. In a tourism-dependent economy, even a short period of price volatility or delivery delays can feed through to ticket pricing, hotel demand and wider business confidence.

Households are exposed as well. Cooking gas, at 94.5% Middle East dependence by value, is one of the clearest signs that this is not only a transport story. A disruption in LPG supply would be felt directly by families, cafés, restaurants and food businesses. In a country where most goods already carry high import and freight costs, even a temporary squeeze can quickly become a cost-of-living issue.

The largest strategic vulnerability sits in marine gas oil. Diesel is the fuel of ferries, cargo movement, fishing operations, harbour services, construction machinery and many backup power systems. With 81.1% of marine gas oil import value linked to Oman and the UAE, the Maldives is exposed not only to an energy shock, but to a logistics shock. In practical terms, that means any prolonged disturbance in Gulf energy corridors could ripple into fish prices, freight rates, construction costs and inter-island connectivity.

The Salalah incident matters because it widens the definition of risk. Reuters reported that no merchant vessel damage was recorded and that Oman said domestic supply continuity had not been interrupted. But the same report also showed that a major commercial port handling fuel infrastructure had come under attack and that operations were halted by at least one major shipping company. That is enough to remind small island importers that supply security is about infrastructure resilience, shipping confidence and route reliability, not just about whether crude or refined product still exists in the market.

For Malé, the policy lesson is straightforward. The Maldives needs to treat fuel sourcing, storage and shipping access as national resilience issues. That means broader supplier diversification beyond the Gulf where commercially possible, stronger strategic stockholding, closer monitoring of shipping and insurance developments, and contingency planning for aviation fuel, LPG and diesel as separate risk streams rather than as one combined import basket.

There is, at present, no public evidence that the Maldives is facing an immediate fuel supply failure. Oman’s official position, as reported by Reuters, is that its oil and petroleum derivative supplies remain uninterrupted. But the import profile alone shows that the country is highly exposed to any worsening of the Gulf conflict. For a small island state that runs on imported energy, that is the real warning.

The Maldives’ fuel and energy security has moved into sharper focus after a drone strike hit fuel storage tanks at Oman’s Port of Salalah, one of the Indian Ocean’s key logistics nodes. Reuters reported that drones struck oil storage facilities at the port, that Omani civil defence warned the fire could take time to contain, and that Maersk said operations at Salalah had been paused until further notice. Reuters also reported that Oman’s authorities said there had been no disruption to the continuity of oil supplies or petroleum derivatives inside the country. Gulf News separately reported that emergency crews were still battling the blaze and that the nature of fuel storage fires could prolong the response.

For the Maldives, the issue is not only whether Oman itself stays supplied. The larger concern is concentration risk. Based on Maldives Customs Service import data for January to November 2025, analysed for MNN News, roughly 80.0% of the total CIF value of fuel imports came from just two Middle Eastern suppliers, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. In value terms, that is about MVR 7.7 billion out of MVR 9.6 billion.

The dependence is particularly high in the categories that matter most to day-to-day economic continuity. Aviation gas imports were 93.7% sourced from Oman and the UAE. Cooking gas was even more concentrated at 94.5%. Marine gas oil, the diesel that underpins inter-island transport, shipping and a large part of the fishing and logistics economy, stood at 81.1%. Petrol was lower, but still significant, at 64.2%.

That structure does not prove an immediate shortage. It does, however, show how quickly a regional security shock can become a Maldivian economic risk. If fuel infrastructure in Oman is struck, if shipping schedules are interrupted, or if insurers and carriers price Gulf routes as more dangerous, the first effects for the Maldives may appear not as empty tanks, but as higher landed costs, delivery uncertainty, tighter inventories and pressure on retail prices.

The aviation exposure is especially sensitive. With 93.7% of aviation gas import value tied to Oman and the UAE, any sustained disturbance in Gulf supply chains could affect airline operating costs, bunkering economics and route planning. In a tourism-dependent economy, even a short period of price volatility or delivery delays can feed through to ticket pricing, hotel demand and wider business confidence.

Households are exposed as well. Cooking gas, at 94.5% Middle East dependence by value, is one of the clearest signs that this is not only a transport story. A disruption in LPG supply would be felt directly by families, cafés, restaurants and food businesses. In a country where most goods already carry high import and freight costs, even a temporary squeeze can quickly become a cost-of-living issue.

The largest strategic vulnerability sits in marine gas oil. Diesel is the fuel of ferries, cargo movement, fishing operations, harbour services, construction machinery and many backup power systems. With 81.1% of marine gas oil import value linked to Oman and the UAE, the Maldives is exposed not only to an energy shock, but to a logistics shock. In practical terms, that means any prolonged disturbance in Gulf energy corridors could ripple into fish prices, freight rates, construction costs and inter-island connectivity.

The Salalah incident matters because it widens the definition of risk. Reuters reported that no merchant vessel damage was recorded and that Oman said domestic supply continuity had not been interrupted. But the same report also showed that a major commercial port handling fuel infrastructure had come under attack and that operations were halted by at least one major shipping company. That is enough to remind small island importers that supply security is about infrastructure resilience, shipping confidence and route reliability, not just about whether crude or refined product still exists in the market.

For Malé, the policy lesson is straightforward. The Maldives needs to treat fuel sourcing, storage and shipping access as national resilience issues. That means broader supplier diversification beyond the Gulf where commercially possible, stronger strategic stockholding, closer monitoring of shipping and insurance developments, and contingency planning for aviation fuel, LPG and diesel as separate risk streams rather than as one combined import basket.

There is, at present, no public evidence that the Maldives is facing an immediate fuel supply failure. Oman’s official position, as reported by Reuters, is that its oil and petroleum derivative supplies remain uninterrupted. But the import profile alone shows that the country is highly exposed to any worsening of the Gulf conflict. For a small island state that runs on imported energy, that is the real warning.