Why this issue is more complex than it appears
The death of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has created a difficult moral and political moment for many Muslim-majority countries. For ordinary Muslims, the instinct may be to respond in emotional terms, through sympathy, condolence, or language of Islamic unity. For governments, however, the calculation is different. States are not only communities of faith. They are also custodians of citizens, borders, trade routes, national finances, and diplomatic relationships. That is why a country such as the Maldives cannot approach this question through sentiment alone. Reuters and other major outlets reported that Khamenei was killed in the US-Israeli strikes of 28 February 2026, while the official Maldivian response of 28 February did not take a side, but instead condemned attacks from all sides and called for de-escalation, peace, and respect for sovereignty.[1][2]
That distinction matters. It shows that Malé is not ignoring the gravity of the event. It is choosing the language of state responsibility. In present conditions, even a condolence message can be interpreted as something larger than condolence. It can be read as strategic alignment. That is precisely what small states must avoid when the region is entering a period of widening military escalation.
The Middle East is not divided by sect alone
One of the most common mistakes in discussing the Middle East is to reduce everything to Sunni versus Shia. That is too narrow. Serious policy scholarship has argued for years that the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is not explained by theology alone. Brookings described the region as a “new Middle East cold war,” in which the real contest is over power, influence, clients, and regional order. In that view, sectarian identity is part of the story, but not the whole story.[3]
Recent analysis from Chatham House makes the same point in a more contemporary form. It notes that countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt did not want a wider war with Iran because they feared the resulting upheaval even more than they feared Iran itself. In other words, regional governments are trying to avoid both Iranian expansionism and regional collapse at the same time.[4] The Council on Foreign Relations has similarly framed the current war as one with potentially severe regional consequences, extending beyond ideology into security, economic disruption, and regime stability.[5]
That is the context in which the Maldives must think. The question is not whether Muslims should care about what has happened in Iran. The question is whether a state should convert moral concern into language that could place it within a hardening geopolitical camp.
Why this is especially sensitive for the Maldives
The Maldives is a Muslim country, but it is also a very small and highly exposed state. Its diplomacy has to be more disciplined than that of larger countries. It depends on stable relations with multiple Gulf partners, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, all of which matter in practical terms for development finance, investment, economic cooperation, air connectivity, and wider bilateral support.[6][7][8][9]
This does not mean the Maldives is anti-Iran. In fact, the official record shows the opposite. The Maldives resumed diplomatic relations with Iran on 10 March 2023, following the Saudi-Iran rapprochement, and later reaffirmed that decision.[10][11] It has also maintained a strong and principled position on Palestine and on broader questions of sovereignty and international law.[12] But that same record also shows that Maldivian policy has long been shaped by regional realities. In 2016, the Maldives strongly condemned the attacks on Saudi diplomatic missions in Iran and expressed support for Saudi Arabia.[13]
Taken together, this tells us something important. The Maldives has not pursued a simplistic anti-Iran line, nor has it pursued an unconditional pro-Iran line. Its conduct has been cautious, adaptive, and shaped by shifts in the wider Islamic diplomatic environment. That is a rational approach for a small state.
Why sentiment can carry real economic and security costs
For the Maldives, the risks are not theoretical. The current conflict already affects the Gulf’s strategic environment, and the Gulf is tied directly to Maldivian welfare. Reuters has reported that Iranian missile attacks have brought the war to Gulf states, unsettling cities, infrastructure, aviation, and business confidence.[14] At the same time, the US Energy Information Administration states that the Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most critical chokepoints. In 2024 and early 2025, flows through Hormuz accounted for more than one-quarter of global seaborne oil trade and around one-fifth of global LNG trade, much of it linked to Qatar.[15]
That matters greatly to the Maldives. The country is import-dependent, fuel-sensitive, and vulnerable to external shocks. The IMF has warned that the Maldives continues to face large external vulnerabilities, including a persistently wide current account deficit and pressure on foreign exchange reserves.[16] In practical terms, any major disruption in Gulf shipping, energy flows, aviation, or investor confidence can feed into higher import costs, inflationary pressure, financial strain, and greater pressure on households and public finances in the Maldives.
There is also a direct citizen-protection concern. Maldivian authorities have already advised Maldivians in the region to limit movement and remain in contact with embassies as the security environment deteriorates.[17] In such circumstances, foreign policy messaging is not merely symbolic. It can affect diplomatic access, crisis management, and the state’s ability to protect nationals abroad.
Islamic unity still matters, but it cannot be careless
None of this means Islamic solidarity is meaningless. It does mean that solidarity must be expressed with discipline. A Muslim-majority state can condemn unlawful attacks, oppose escalation, reject collective punishment, defend the sovereignty of states, and pray for peace across the Muslim world, all without appearing to join one side of a regional power struggle.
That is the line the Maldives appears to be following. It is not a betrayal of the Ummah. It is an attempt to act responsibly within it. The state must think beyond emotion, because its duty is not only to express feeling. Its duty is to protect the welfare of Maldivians, preserve strategic room for manoeuvre, and avoid language that could draw the country into a conflict that is larger, older, and far more dangerous than a single statement can capture.
Conclusion
The real question is not whether the Maldives feels concern over what has happened in Iran. It clearly does. The real question is whether that concern should be expressed in a way that may be interpreted as political alignment in a region already fractured by rivalry, war, and mistrust. For a large power, that may be manageable. For a small island state with economic vulnerabilities, expatriates abroad, and crucial ties across the Gulf, it is not.
In moments such as this, restraint is not indifference. It is policy. And for the Maldives, it may be the most responsible form of solidarity available.
References
- Reuters, Khamenei killing shatters Iran’s order, triggers high-stakes succession race, 1 March 2026. (Reuters) ↩
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Maldives, Statement by the Government of the Republic of Maldives on recent developments in the Middle East, 28 February 2026. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ↩
- F. Gregory Gause III, Brookings, Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War. (Brookings) ↩
- Galip Dalay, Chatham House, Why are Middle Eastern governments lobbying against a US attack on Iran?, 19 February 2026. (Chatham House) ↩
- Council on Foreign Relations, Gauging the Impact of Massive U.S.-Israeli Strikes on Iran, 2026. (Council on Foreign Relations) ↩
- Ministry of Finance of the Maldives, Saudi Fund for Development. (finance.gov.mv) ↩
- Saudi Fund for Development, project and cooperation updates on the Maldives. (sfd.gov.sa) ↩
- Ministry of Finance of the Maldives, Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. (finance.gov.mv) ↩
- Maldives and Qatar official bilateral updates, 2025. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ↩
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Maldives, Diplomatic Relations. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ↩
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Maldives, Statement by the Government of Maldives welcoming the joint trilateral statement by Saudi Arabia, Iran and China, 10 March 2023. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ↩
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Maldives, official statements on Palestine and international law. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ↩
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Maldives, Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Dunya Maumoon at the OIC Extraordinary Meeting, 21 January 2016. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) ↩
- Reuters, Iranian missiles shake Gulf cities after US, Israeli strikes on Iran, 28 February 2026. (Reuters) ↩
- U.S. Energy Information Administration, Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical to global energy security, 16 June 2025. (U.S. Energy Information Administration) ↩
- IMF, IMF Staff Completes 2025 Article IV Mission to the Maldives, 18 February 2025. (IMF) ↩
- Maldivian safety advisory relating to nationals in the Middle East, reported 2026. (Sun English Edition) ↩
